Even among those who agree that hypological judgments are distinct from both deontic and aretaic judgments, there is, however, disagreement about just what such judgments are judgments of. There are two closely related views on this which I shall mention here. The first is that to be morally responsible just is to be the appropriate object of one or more of what P. F. Strawson5 calls the "reactive attitudes," such as resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, and the like. This view has recently garnered considerable support. 6 The second view is that to be morally responsible is to be such that there is an "entry" in one's "moral ledger" in light of some fact about oneself; one's "moral record as a person" is affected by this fact. 7 (In putting matters this way, I do not mean to presuppose either that it is or that it is not possible to arrive at an overall assessment of one's moral worth by somehow aggregating the individual entries in one's ledger.) This is to put the second view only roughly, for a person may have a number of moral ledgers or records; but it can be made more precise by allying it to some degree with the first view. The moral record at issue is precisely that which renders the person the appropriate object of reactive attitudes (and, moreover, liable to more robust reactive measures, such as reward and punishment, that incorporate but extend beyond such attitudes). The difference between the first and second views is that, whereas the former identifies responsibility with susceptibility to certain reactive attitudes, the latter identifies responsibility with that in virtue of which one is susceptible to such attitudes. On the first view, the claim that responsibility is the proper occasion for certain reactive attitudes is analytic; on the second view, this is a substantive claim whose truth can be sensibly disputed. 8 Although nothing will turn on this here, it is the second view to which I subscribe and in terms of which I shall couch my thesis. When I say that a person is praiseworthy, I shall mean that her moral record is favorably affected by some fact about herself; when I say that a person is blameworthy, I shall mean that her moral record is adversely affected by some such fact. To praise or blame someone, in this sense, is simply to make a judgment about her moral record, a judgment which may form the basis of, but which is not itself, a "reaction" either in attitude or in some more robust form of behavior toward that person.
It is standardly acknowledged that there are two key components of moral responsibility, one epistemic and the other metaphysical. Here, I shall concentrate on the latter, which has to do with the freedom or control that the agent enjoys. 9 Almost all writers on the subject have assumed that moral responsibility presupposes some form of freedom or control. There have of course been exceptions. Robert Merrihew Adams, 10 for example, has argued that we are responsible for our sins, whether or not they are voluntary. The graduate of the Hitler Jugend, he says, is to be blamed for his beliefs and actions, regardless of whether they are in his control (ibid., p. 19) . Similarly, Eugene Schlossberger 11 has claimed that moral responsibility is simply a matter of moral evaluability, and there is no requirement that the agent enjoy any measure of control over that for which he is evaluable. One may be properly morally evaluated, Schlossberger says, in light of not just one's actions but also one's beliefs, emotions, and so on, irrespective of whether one is in control of them (ibid., pp. 6ff., 37ff., 101ff.). Thomas Scanlon 12 contends that one is morally responsible for having certain attributes, even if one was not in control of coming to possess them, so long as it is appropriate to ask that one defend or disown them (ibid., pp. 274ff.). And others 13 have made similar claims.
If the view of Adams and others were correct, then the perennial philosophical preoccupation with the relation between freedom and causal determinism would be badly misguided, insofar as it is driven (as it very often is) by a concern with coming to terms with moral responsibility. But I do not think that it is correct. Adams and others are, I believe, quite right to say that not all moral evaluations of or concerning an agent presuppose that the agent is in control of that in light of which the evaluations are made. It is surely correct to say that there can be, as Michael Slote 14 puts it, ethics without free will. Much of virtue ethics, I would say, has nothing whatever to do with freedom or control. But that, of course, does not mean that the sort of moral evaluation that has to do with moral responsibility in particular has nothing to do with freedom or control. For example, while we may justifiably condemn evil wherever we find it, the fact is that it comes in various forms. In a recent, interesting discussion of moral evil, Daniel M. Haybron 15 contrasts the sort of evil embodied by Claggart, the master-atarms in Herman Melville's Billy Budd, with the sort of evil embodied by Dorian Gray in Oscar Wilde's story. He puts the matter well:
The purely evil individual [such as Claggart] is unquestionably vile, but he lacks an important fault: he does not give himself freely to evil, but is delivered to it. Claggart could not help but be a cruel manthat's just the way he is. Dorian Gray's cruelty, on the other hand, is entirely of his own making (ibid., p. 143).
On the assumption that Haybron's observation is accurate, Claggart, though clearly morally evaluable in light of his particular brand of cruelty, is not, I would say, morally responsible for it, whereas this cannot be said of Dorian Gray regarding the cruelty that characterizes him.
There are complications, of course. We should distinguish between having dispositions and acting on them, and so too between having control over and being morally responsible for one's dispositions and having control over and being morally responsible for acting on them. Still, at this point, let me just say that I side with the majority who declare freedom or control essential to moral responsibility. 16 Thus the relation between freedom and causal determinism is for me a live issue. What I want to argue here is that a great deal of recent discussion, enlightening though much of it has been, has missed what is crucial about the connection between freedom and responsibility. Once what is crucial has been correctly identified, something strange happens: the connection itself becomes quite tenuous. This, in turn, threatens to undermine many of our common practices-in particular, the practice of punishment.
II
The great bulk of recent discussion of the connection between freedom and moral responsibility has focused on the issue of whether the control required by moral responsibility itself requires that the agent have the option to choose or act in a manner distinct from that in which he does choose and act-the issue, that is, of whether moral responsibility is possible in the absence of alternate possibilities. Harry G. Frankfurt"' has famously argued that moral responsibility does not require alternate possibilities. If correct, this is obviously important, inasmuch as the traditional incompatibilist position is one according to which moral responsibility is incompatible with causal determinism precisely because such responsibility requires alternate possibilities and alternate possibilities are incompatible with causal determinism. There are several 18 who have rejected Frankfurt's argument, and their voice has grown increasingly strong in recent years. There are also several 19 who have accepted it. The discussion has been complex and subtle, and I believe much progress has been made. Nonetheless, all parties to the debate have tended to overlook what is crucial to the relation between freedom and moral responsibility.
Why is freedom commonly regarded as important to moral responsibility? The usual answer is simply that we cannot be morally responsible for what is not in our contro1. 20 I believe that this answer is accurate but incomplete. There is a more general point to be made, and that is that the degree to which we are morally responsible cannot be affected by what is not in our control. Put more pithily: luck is irrelevant to moral responsibility. 21 This is the crucial point at issue. Pursuit of it will show that the question whether freedom requires alternate possibilities, and even the question whether freedom is compatible with causal determinism, paradoxically become considerably less significant than they are frequently taken to be.
The relevance of luck to moral responsibility has been widely debated ever since the publication of the influential pair of papers on moral luck written by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nage1. 22 But seldom have the implications of the denial of the relevance of luck to moral responsibility been pursued to their logical conclusion. It is this that I shall undertake here. We can distinguish between two broad types of luck, which I shall call resultant and situational. 23 The former consists in luck with respect to the results of one's choices and actions; the latter consists in luck with respect to the situations in which one finds oneself. It is the former that is most often discussed, but it is the latter whose implications run deepest and are, as we shall see, especially subversive of our everyday judgments about moral responsibility. Nagel writes, "to be more or less culpable depending on whether...a bird [gets] into the path of one's bullet" (op. cit., p. 143)? My answer is that this is not possible. Let us compare cases. Suppose that George shot at Henry and killed him. Suppose that Georg shot at Henrik in circumstances which were, to the extent possible, exactly like those of George (by which I mean to include what went on "inside" the protagonists' heads as well as what happened in the "outside" world), except for the fact that Georg's bullet was intercepted by a passing bird (a rather large and solid bird) and Henrik escaped injury. Inasmuch as the bird's flight was not in Georg's control, the thesis that luck is irrelevant to moral responsibility implies that George and Georg are equally morally responsible. This, I believe, is absolutely correct.
You may have some doubts. "If George and Georg are equally responsible," you may say, "then, since Georg is not responsible for killing Henrik-the bird luckily got in the way (or unluckily, depending on whose perspective is at issue: Henrik's, Georg's, or the bird's)-it follows that George is not responsible for killing Henry. But that's absurd. If that were the case, no one would ever be responsible for killing anyone, since success in one's endeavors always requires the cooperation of factors that are beyond one's control."
This objection is based on a misunderstanding. I do not wish to deny that George is responsible for killing Henry (or for Henry's death-the distinction between actions and their "results" 24 seems to me irrelevant here); whether he is so will depend on details of the case (both epistemic and metaphysical) which I have not supplied. And, of course, I concede that Georg is not responsible for killing Henrik (or for Henrik's death), since Henrik did not die. Thus I am quite willing to grant that George may well be responsible for more things than Georg. What I deny is that George is any mare responsible than Georg. We must distinguish the degree of someone's responsibility from its scope. (The term 'extent' strikes me as ambiguous between the two.) My claim is that George and Georg bear responsibility to the same degree, despite the fact that George's responsibility has greater scope. Let us suppose that George committed murder when he killed Henry and is indeed to blame for doing so. (This requires that George satisfy both some epistemic condition and some condition concerning freedom or control. There is no need for me to specify these conditions further; I invite you to fill in the details as you deem fit.) On the view of responsibility adumbrated earlier, this means that George's moral record as a person is adversely affected in some way in virtue of the fact that he killed Henry as he did. My claim is that, although Henrik survived Georg's attempt to kill him, Georg's moral record as a person is adversely affected in precisely the same way.
"But what," you may ask, "is Georg supposed to be responsible for? In virtue of what is his moral record supposed to be adversely affected?" The answer is simple: he is responsible for his attempt on Henrik's life, just as George is responsible for his attempt on Henry's life. The fact that Georg's attempt was unsuccessful, whereas George's was successful, is irrelevant to the question of how blameworthy they are.
"But that is to trivialize Henry's death," you may protest. No, it is not. Clearly, something terrible happened when George killed Henry, something that has no counterpart in the case of Georg and Henrik. It may even be agreed that George did something morally wrong that Georg did not. But that is a deontic judgment. 25 My claim is simply that, when it comes to judgments about responsibility, more particularly to judgments about degree of responsibility, George and Georg are on a par. It is especially important to note that this claim affords Georg no excuse whatsoever. I have said that George is no more to blame than Georg, and that may seem to suggest that George is not particularly blameworthy. But, of course, there is no such implication. I could equally well have said that Georg is no less to blame than George; the passing bird in no way mitigates Georg's blameworthiness.
You may still be uneasy. "Wouldn't it be appropriate," you may ask, "to react more harshly toward George than toward Georg-for instance, to punish him more severely? Doesn't this show that George is more blameworthy than Georg after all?" This is a difficult matter. I have agreed that responsibility is directly correlated, even if it is not identical, with susceptibility to reactive attitudes (and to more robust reactive measures). Given this, it might seem that I am committed to denying that it is appropriate to react more harshly toward George than toward Georg. And in one sense I am. I am committed to denying that George deserves (in virtue of his moral record) a harsher reaction than Georg. But that leaves open the possibility that it would be morally justified to react more harshly toward George than toward Georg for reasons other than those having to do with desert (or, more precisely, desert rooted in George's moral record). Perhaps there are good moral reasons to punish murder, such as that committed by George, more severely than a failed attempt at murder, such as that committed by Georg-I am not sure about this; but, if there are, they are grounded in something other than relative degree of responsibility.
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I believe that anyone who takes seriously the view that we cannot be morally responsible for that which is not in our control must acknowledge that George and Georg are equally responsible and thus accept the more general claim that luck is irrelevant to moral responsibility. I recognize that there is a clear sense in which George was in control of Henry's death; he was (we may assume) in control of whether he shot at Henry in the way that he did, and, under the circumstances, shooting at Henry in that way was all that was needed to kill him. He shot at Henry, and Henry consequently died; had he not shot at Henry, Henry would not have died. Nonetheless, it is also true that George controlled Henry's death only to the extent that he controlled his shooting at Henry; the other factors that conspired to produce Henry's death were not in his control at all. In this respect, George was no more in control of what happened to Henry than Georg was in control of what happened to Henrik. 27 Just as with responsibility, so too with control: we must distinguish degree from scope. George was in control of more things than Georg (his control had greater scope), but he was no more in control of what happened than Georg was (he was in control to the same degree). Insofar as degree of responsibility tracks degree of control, George and Georg must be declared equally morally responsible.
Although what I have said about equality of desert already casts some doubt on our current practice of punishment, there is nothing in what I have said so far that impugns the significance of the questions whether freedom requires alternate possibilities and whether freedom is compatible with causal determinism. If George and Georg are morally responsible for their respective attempts at murder, this is (in part) because they freely committed these attempts. Whether such freedom requires that they could have acted differently seems an important question. Whether such freedom requires causal indeterminism likewise seems an important question. The thesis that resultant luck is irrelevant to moral responsibility does nothing to reduce the urgency of these questions.
But the thesis that situational luck is irrelevant to moral responsibility is a different matter. Once again, this is a type of luck with which we are all familiar. But few 28 appear to take it seriously, perhaps because doing so is disturbingly humbling. "There but for the grace of God go I," we may mutter on occasion, but then we quickly turn away from such a discomfiting thought.
There are two basic varieties of luck regarding the situations in which one finds oneself: the first having to do with one's circumstances, the second with one's constitution. I shall discuss each in turn.
Return to George and Henry and their counterparts, Georg and Henrik. Suppose, as before, that George shot at Henry and killed him. Suppose also, as before, that Georg did not kill Henrik; suppose now, however, that this was not because he took a shot that was intercepted by some unfortunate bird, but rather because he took no shot at all. And suppose that this was because of something quite fortuitous: Georg sneezed just as he was about to shoot, for example; or a truck pulled up in front of Henrik, blocking Georg's line of fire; or Henrik turned suddenly into a doorway, just as Georg was about to squeeze the trigger. Whereas in the case involving the bird, luck intervened after the shot took place, thereby preventing Henrik's death, in this sort of case the intervention occurs earlier, before Georg has a chance to act at all. But the cases are united in that, in all of them, Georg would have freely killed Henrik but for some feature of the case over which he had no control. This being so, it seems that we must conclude here, as before, that Georg is as culpable as George. The circumstances that conspired to save Henrik afford Georg no excuse. 
be said that Georg was in control of his being such that he would have freely killed Henrik. 29 In my view (which I shall not try to defend here), an agent exercises control directly over his choices (that is, his choosings) and indirectly over the consequences of his choices. In the sort of case under discussion, Georg's being such that he would have freely killed Henrik is clearly not itself a choice of his; nor is it the consequence of a choice of his. Rather, he would have freely killed Henrik because he would have freely chosen to shoot him, had he had the cooperation of certain features of the case; and this is a choice which did not occur, precisely because the requisite cooperation was not forthcoming.
I think, therefore, that we should reject the claim that Georg is responsible for being such that he would have freely killed Henrik. And I think that there is nothing else for which Georg might be said to be responsible. 30 If so, this sort of case serves to emphasize, in even more dramatic fashion than before, the distinction between degree and scope of responsibility. The degree of Georg's responsibility remains the same as George's, but the scope of Georg's responsibility has dwindled to nothing. Georg is responsible; he is just not responsible for anything. He is, as I shall put it, "responsible tout court." Lest this appear unduly paradoxical, let me hasten to add that it is nonetheless the case that Georg is responsible in virtue of something, and this something just is his being such that he would have freely killed Henrik, had he had the cooperation of certain features of the case.
31
All responsibility, including responsibility tout court, is fundamentally relational. It is precisely because George is responsible in virtue of the very same sort of fact (the fact that he would have freely killed someone, had he had the cooperation-as he did-of certain features of the case) in virtue of which Georg is responsible, that George and Georg are responsible to the same degree.
Let me turn now from circumstantial to constitutive luck, 32 from luck having to do with one's external situation to luck having to do with one's internal situation. Suppose, for instance, that the reason why Georg did not kill Henrik was that he was too timid, or that he had a thick skin and Henrik's insults did not upset him in the way that Henry's insults upset George, or that he was deaf and simply did not hear the insults that Henrik hurled his way. If it is nonetheless true that Georg would have freely shot and killed Henrik but for some such feature of the case over which he had no control, then, I contend, he is just as responsible, in virtue of this fact, as George is.
33
V If what I have just said is true, then I believe the question whether freedom requires alternate possibilities loses a good deal of its significance. This is because even those who deny that freedom requires alternate possibilities will, of course, agree that freedom does not require the absence of alternate possibilities. So let us suppose that, when George freely killed Henry, he had the option not to do so. Given that he satisfied whatever epistemic requirement must be met in order to be responsible, everyone will agree that George is responsible for killing Henry. 34 What should we say if we were now to suppose that George lacked the option not to kill Henry, due to some Frankfurtian constraint? Some would say that George freely killed Henry anyway; others would say that, if the constraint really did deprive George of any (relevant) alternate possibility, then he did not freely kill Henry after all. Given the assumption that moral responsibility requires freedom, many have understandably thought that it is therefore very important to determine whether the agent does act freely in such a case. But, as I see it, this concern is considerably diluted, if it is agreed that George would have freely killed Henry in the absence of the Frankfurtian constraint. For we should then conclude that, regardless of whether he did freely kill Henry, George is in fact just as responsible as he would have been had he freely killed Henry.
Indeed, in light of this, even the supposedly fundamental question whether freedom is compatible with causal determinism loses much of its force. (It may retain more of its force than the question regarding alternate possibilities, however, insofar as some of those who deny that freedom requires indeterminism do claim that it requires determinism. 35 ) Consider a case of luck that has to do with what may be called antecedent circumstances. 36 Suppose that Georg had been subjected to some Clockwork Orange-type conditioning process that rendered him incapable of killing. (This would seem to count as a case of constitutive as well as circumstantial luck.) If it is nonetheless true that he would have freely killed Henrik, but for this conditioning process over which he had no control, then he is just as responsible as George. Suppose, now, that Georg was not conditioned not to kill Henrik but simply that he was deterministically caused not to (the chain of causation extending back before Georg's birth, if you wish). Incompatibilists would claim that his not killing Henrik was therefore unfree, whereas compatibilists would deny this. But, as I see it, the significance of this dispute is considerably reduced by the observation that, even if the incompatibilist is right, Georg is still as responsible as George, if he would have freely killed Henrik, had his causal history cooperated. 37 My conclusion is that it is perfectly possible for someone to be morally responsible, even if causal determinism is true and even if freedom is incompatible with such determinism. To put it bluntly, it does not matter whether Georg could have killed Henrik. What matters is whether he would have freely killed him, if he had the cooperation of certain features of the case. And I say this even though I take freedom to be crucial to judgments of moral responsibility.
To get clear on just what my proposal is, let us return for a moment to the two positions mentioned at the outset. They can be laid out formally as follows:
(A) (1) Moral responsibility requires freedom.
(2) Freedom requires alternate possibilities. In each case, we have an inconsistent triad. To resolve the inconsistency, what I have proposed is this. First, I have conceded that one cannot be morally responsible for something unless that thing is or was in one's control, and so in this sense clause (1) of (A) and (B) must be granted. 38 If clause (2) should also be granted (a matter about which I have been noncommittal; note that it is possible that clause (2) should be granted in one case but not the other), then of course clause (3) must be rejected. But I have argued, further, that one can be morally responsible tout court, that is, responsible without being responsible for something, and that, on this understanding, clause (1) of (A) and (B) should be rejected. Thus, even if clause (2) should in each case be granted, clause (3) may (and, I believe, should) also be accepted. That is precisely what reduces the significance of the question whether clause (2) is true.
At this point I should say something to forestall certain possible misunderstandings.
First, do not be misled by what I have just said into thinking that I am invoking two types of moral responsibility here. On the contrary, there is just one type. George and Georg are to be morally evaluated in exactly the same way, even though George is responsible for something that Georg is not. They are equally responsible; if George is deserving of a particular reaction, then Georg is deserving of the very same reaction. This indicates that whether there is something for which one is responsible is immaterial; all that matters, fundamentally, is whether one is responsible. Degree of responsibility counts for everything, scope for nothing, when it comes to such moral evaluation of agents. Thus my concession just now that clause (3) of (A) and (B) may have to be rejected, if one's concern is with the possibility of one's being responsible for something, is of small moment. What matters, at bottom, is that clause (3) may and, I believe, should be accepted, if one's concern is with responsibility tout court. 39 Second, do not be misled by my claim that clause (1) of (A) and (B) is to be rejected (given that one's concern is with responsibility tout court) into thinking that I am reverting to the position of Adams and others mentioned above, to the effect that freedom is irrelevant to moral responsibility. On the contrary, I want to insist that it is pivotal, in that the degree to which we are morally responsible cannot be affected by what is not in our control. It is this crucial fact which renders luck, not freedom, irrelevant to responsibility. Granted, my view implies that Claggart might after all be as responsible as Dorian Gray; this would be true if Claggart would have freely given himself to evil, as Gray did, had he had the opportunity to do so. In saying this, however, I am not collapsing the distinction between aretaic judgments and hypological judgments upon which I insisted earlier. That distinction remains. I am saying that, in addition to the sort of aretaic judgment that is appropriate to Claggart (but not to Gray) in light of his particular type of moral depravity, it may be that a certain judgment about moral responsibility is equally appropriate to both. 40 In saying this, I am invoking the view (which I attributed above to Slote, and with which Haybron clearly concurs in his discussion of Claggart) that some types of moral judgments, in particular certain judgments about moral virtue and vice, do not presuppose that we enjoy freedom of will. A sadist is evil, I would say, even if he cannot control either having or acting on his sadistic impulses. Naturally, this may be resisted. Such a person, it might be objected, is no more evil than a "vicious" dog (the quotation marks constituting an acknowledgment that a dog, of course, cannot really have a vice, let alone a moral one), precisely because he shares the inability to control his viciousness. But while we should surely agree that a vicious dog is not evil, there are possible explanations of this which do not appeal to its lack of control over its having or acting on its vicious impulses. One explanation is that a dog is not the sort of creature that typically has such control, whereas a sadist is. Perhaps this has some merit, but to my mind a better explanation is that a dog lacks the capacity to reflect on its behavior in moral (or morally relevant) terms, whereas a sadist typically does not.
Suppose I am wrong about this. Suppose that luck is as irrelevant to aretaic as to hypological judgments. Suppose, further, that nothing else serves to distinguish judgments about virtue and vice from judgments about responsibility tout court. 41 In this case, my argument implies that hypological judgments do after all collapse into aretaic judgments. Although I reject this conclusion, it would still be significant, relying as it does on the central idea that, when it comes to judgments about moral responsibility, it is at bottom only responsibility tout court that matters; judgments about responsibility far something are essentially otiose.
A final possible source of misunderstanding is my use of the term `responsibility tout court'. It is intended to drive home the idea that we can be responsible without being responsible for anything. But, as I said earlier, it is not intended to suggest that responsibility can be nonrelational. In every case, Georg is responsible in virtue of some fact-the very same kind of fact in virtue of which George is responsible-even if in some of these cases (the ones involving situational luck) George is responsible for something while Georg is not. Nor should the term 'responsibility tout court' be thought to suggest that there is just one way in which an agent is responsible on any given occasion. On the contrary, since an indefinite number of counterfactuals about what one would do, if one were differently situated, can be true at once, one can be morally responsible tout court-both positively and negatively-to an indefinite number of degrees at once. 42 The view that I propose thus opens up the floodgates, as it were, when it comes to ascriptions of responsibility-of laudability as well as culpability. 43 The consequent profusion of ascriptions has profound practical implications, as I shall now briefly explain.
If, as I have urged, the truth of hypological judgments turns not just on what we actually freely do but, more deeply, on what we would counterfactually freely do, then the differences between individuals regarding the hypological judgments that are appropriate to them threaten to dissolve. (To what extent differences may still remain can only be a matter of speculation, depending on a number of issues that cannot be broached here.) For example, it may well be that not only Georg but most or even all of us would have freely acted as George did, were it not for some feature of our situation over which we lacked control. If so, we are, in virtue of this fact, deserving of the same reaction as George; if he deserves punishment, then so do we. By the same token, if George would have freely led the same sort of upright life as the lives that you and I lead, were it not for some feature of his situation over which he lacked control, then he is deserving of the same reaction as we; if we deserve to be rewarded (or at least not to be punished), then so does he. This casts considerable doubt on the propriety of our current practices, especially the practice of punishment. My point is not that no one can be culpable or deserving of punishment. Rather, it is that those whom we actually punish are likely to be no more deserving of punishment than many of those whom we do not punish and also likely to be as deserving of reward (or at least of nonpunishment) as many of those whom we reward (or refrain from punishing). Insofar as our current practices are based on judgments about what people deserve in light of the responsibility they bear, they radically distort the truth and are deeply discriminatory. VI My argument here depends crucially on the claim that Georg would have freely killed Henrik, had certain features of the case cooperated. There are several reasons that may be given for denying this claim and, hence, for rejecting the argument.
One reason is this: we are never justified in making such a claim, at least when the antecedent is not satisfied. Even if it is true that Georg would have freely killed Henrik, if certain features of the case had cooperated, we cannot know this if such cooperation was, in fact, not forthcoming.
In response, let me grant that it is often likely to be true that we do not and cannot know such a thing, but I do not see why it should always be true. Suppose that Georg, stung by Henrik's insults, had plotted long and hard for revenge, that he had repeatedly voiced his desire to see Henrik dead, that the day had come to put his plan into action, that he had positioned himself in the appropriate place at the appropriate time, that he had raised his gun and was on the brink of shooting point-blank at an unprotected Henrik-and that he was interrupted by a sneeze at the crucial moment. And suppose that I was at his side every step of the way, witnessing all that took place. Under such conditions, I think I would be justified in claiming that Georg would have freely killed Henrik, had he not sneezed when he did. But even if I am mistaken about this, my thesis here is unaffected; for this thesis depends, not on our knowing whether counterfactuals of this sort are true, but simply on their being true.
A second reason for doubting my thesis is this: such counterfactuals are never known to be true precisely because they never are true. But why think this? One answer would simply be that counterfactuals generally have no truth value. I shall not try to respond to this; I simply assume here that certain counterfactuals are true and that some account of them, perhaps along something like the well-known lines supplied by David Lewis," is correct. Another answer is that, even though counterfactuals do generally have a truth value, counterfactuals of the sort at issue here, that have to do with free action in particular, are never true. Let me say something briefly about this.
It must be granted that it is possible that the sort of counterfactuals that are at issue here are never true. For example, even if we must accept the truth of the claim that, if certain features of the case had cooperated, it would have been the case that Georg either did or did not freely kill Henrik, it remains perfectly possible that it is not true either that, if there had been such cooperation, it would have been the case that Georg did freely kill Henrik, or that, if there had been such cooperation, it would have been the case that Georg did not freely kill Henrik (ibid., pp. 16ff.). Perhaps this sort of thing sometimes happens; if it does, it will of course block the ascription of responsibility tout court to the agent. But although this may happen on occasion, why think that it is always actually the case?
It has been argued that, in fact, this must always be the case, if freedom is, as the libertarian conceives of it, incompatible with causal determinism. This argument is usually given in the context of a discussion whether divine foreknowledge is compatible with such freedom. Alvin Plantinga 45 has asserted that counterfactuals concerning such freedom can be, and often are, true (ibid., pp. 173ff.). Adams and others 46 have argued to the contrary, on the grounds that counterfactuals require a necessary connection between antecedent and consequent, and that this conflicts with the libertarian view that freedom requires the absence of any such necessitation. This is a difficult matter which I cannot try to resolve here. Let me simply note the following. First, if freedom is compatible with causal determinism, then, even if Adams and others are correct, the argument that Georg is as responsible as George in all the various scenarios we have discussed is entirely unaffected. Second, if freedom is incompatible with causal determinism, then, even if Adams and others are correct (which is disputable), the argument, though admittedly affected, is not undercut nearly as drastically as it might at first appear. This is because, as Adams and others are ready to agree, even if it must be false that Georg would have freely killed Henrik, had he had the cooperation of certain features of the case which was, in fact, not forthcoming, it can nonetheless be true that Georg would probably have freely killed Henrik, had such cooperation been forthcoming, for as high a degree of probability as you like (short of certainty). 47 This may not satisfy the defender of the view that divine foreknowledge is compatible with libertarian freedom, insofar as God is supposed to be essentially infallible, but it suffices to show that Georg's blamelessness is by no means guaranteed. Suppose that there is a probability of .99 that Georg would have freely killed Henrik, had he not sneezed. Then one of two things follows: either Georg is 99% as responsible as George, or there is a 99% chance that Georg is as responsible as George. It is not clear to me which we should say, although I lean toward the latter. 48 In either case, Georg clearly cannot count on having a clean moral record just because he sneezed.
Of course, if Adams and others are right, then the question whether freedom is compatible with determinism recovers some of the significance that has traditionally been accorded to it. But if I am right that Georg is nonetheless probably as responsible as, or nearly as responsible as, George, this question certainly does not recover all of its significance.
A point related to the last one is this. Even if Adams and others are not right, might it not be that the truth of the claim that Georg would have freely killed Henrik depends on whether freedom is compatible with causal determinism? If so, would this not restore the significance of the question whether compatibilism is true?
This is a difficult matter. In principle, I do not see why there should not be considerable convergence between the judgments of compatibilists and incompatibilists regarding whether some agent would have freely done soand-so under such-and-such circumstances. 49 To the extent that this is so, the question whether freedom is compatible with determinism is moot. To the extent that this is not so, however, I concede that the significance of this question is restored. But, even then, there is a strict limit to the restoration. As long as an incompatibilist is prepared to agree that some agent would, or would probably, have freely acted in some way in which he was caused not to act, and that this fact grounds the ascription of responsibility tout court to the agent, the question whether freedom is compatible with determinism simply does not recover all of the significance that has traditionally been accorded to it.
A final reason to be skeptical of the claim that Georg would have freely killed Henrik, had certain features of the case cooperated, has to do with those cases that concern constitutive luck in particular. It has been suggested that such luck is incoherent, inasmuch as it presupposes that one could have been a different person. 50 I deny this. What it presupposes is that one could have had different personal characteristics, and surely this is sometimes true. If Georg failed to kill Henrik simply because he was deaf (literally) to Henrik's insults, it seems clearly intelligible to say that he would, or would probably, have freely killed Henrik had he not been deaf. But what of other characteristics, such as being timid or thick skinned? Can we intelligibly say that Georg would have freely killed Henrik had he not had such characteristics as these? That depends on whether such characteristics are essential to Georg. I am inclined to think that they are not, but this is another difficult matter that I shall not try to resolve here. 51 Let me simply note that, if such characteristics are not essential to those who have them, then the truth of the relevant counterfactuals is unaffected. I concede, however, that, if any such characteristics are had essentially, then the relevant counterfactuals are indeed false.
52
This concession is important. It means that the role that luck plays in the determination of moral responsibility may not be entirely eliminable, even if it is to be neutralized to the extent that I have argued for here. That is because, regardless of just which personal characteristics should be said to be essential to persons, it is presumably correct to say that some are. Consider any such characteristic that Georg may have. It is then necessarily false to say that Georg would have freely killed Henrik had he not had that characteristic. In such a case, Georg does get off the hook, even though he was, of course, not in control of whether he had the characteristic in question. 53 (Or rather, my argument does not suffice to keep him on the hook. The general thesis that one cannot escape responsibility through luck should incline one to think that Georg can be responsible even in a case in which he fails to act freely due to some characteristic that is essential to him, since the possession of any such characteristic is a matter of luck.) But this concession is not enough to resurrect the significance traditionally accorded to the questions whether freedom requires alternate possibilities and whether freedom is compatible
